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with protection of the dissenting union member the keynote throughout.
American legislation was extremely harsh and, read literally, completely prohibitive. Considerable watering down of Section 3o4 by the courts has resulted
in uncertainty as regards both coverage and constitutionality and has enabled the
courts to introduce criteria not necessarily relevant to the policy considerations
underlying the statute. New legislation is called for. As to the protection of
minority members, British legislation suggests possible solutions for the guidance of American legislators, but the problem of labor's undue influence is much
more difficult. At best a difficult concept to define in the financial context of
Section 3o4, the undue influence problem might better be handled by being left
to general election laws, as in Great Britain; by strengthened publicity requirements; or by some system limiting but not prohibiting unions' financial participation in elections.
CONTRIBUTION AND INDEMNITY'IN ILLINOIS
NEGLIGENCE CASES
The authorities agree that contribution between intentional co-tort-feasors
should be denied since they are wrongdoers "not deserving of the aid of courts in
achieving equal or proportionate distribution of the common burden.", It is
also quite generally agreed that if one co-tort-feasor is adjudged liable for an
injury although he was without fault, the law will grant total recovery, or indemnity, to the guiltless tort-feasor who has paid the injured person. While
agreement thus exists when intentional or innocent tort-feasors are involved,
controversy remains as to the right of contribution when the tort-feasors are
negligent.
With the early English decision of Merryweatherv. Nixan3 as a foundation,
American courts at first refused to apply the rule against contribution among
tort-feasors to cases involving mere negligence.4 The origin and reason for the
I Commissioner's Prefatory Note to Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, 9
U.L.A. 153 ('95').
2 E.g., George A. Fuller Co. v. Otis Elevator Co., 245 U.S. 489 (19x8); Griffiths & Son Co.
261
v. Nat'l Fireproofing Co., 3io Ill.
331, 14z N.E. 739 (1923); Farwell v. Becker, 129 Ill.
(1889). See Prosser, Torts 1114 (1941).
38 Durnf. & E. 186 (K.B., 1799). There is a very incomplete report of the case but the
authorities seem agreed that the tort-feasor had acted in concert and wilfully. Later English"
cases so limited the decision, and held that the rule against contribution did not apply unless
the plaintiff was a wilful wrongdoer. Betts v. Gibbins, 2 Ad. & Ell. 57 (K.B., 1834); Palmer
v. Wick & Pulteneytown Steam Shipping Co., [1894] A.C. 318.
4Thweatt's

Adm'r v. Jones,

22

Va.

328,

ioAm. Dec. 538

(1823)

(tobacco inspector may

obtain contribution from co-inspector where their joint liability for conversion of tobacco
did not arise out of intentional tort); Armstrong County v. Clarion County, 66 Pa. 218, 5 Am.
Rep. 368 (1870) (county held liable for injury resulting from negligent maintenance of bridge
allowed contribution from another county jointly responsible for maintenance); Nickerson v.
Wheeler, 118 Mass. 295 (1875) (other corporate officers liable in contribution to president
whose property had been taken in satisfaction of execution obtained by corporate creditor
against all officers personally liable because of failure to file certificates).
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rule were soon lost sight of, and today, in the absence of statutes, the great majority of courts refuse to permit contribution even where the joint tort-feasors s
have not acted in concert or intentionally. 6 Most legal scholars, however, maintain that negligent tort-feasors are not such "rascals" that they should be denied access to the courts. Recognizing the apparent injustice of thrusting upon
one defendant alone the entire burden of a loss for which two defendants are
unintentionally responsible, some courts have completely repudiated the nocontribution dogma.8
Criticism of the rule has not, however, been unanimous, and unsuspected virtues have been found in the rule under new theories of loss distribution.9 The
rule has also been backed by a goodly portion of the very persons who in theory
should benefit from the contribution doctrine, companies insuring defendants
to whom the contribution remedy would be available."' The insurance companies have argued that contribution would often be useless against irresponsible
persons and that its introduction would increase litigation and impede settles Originally the term "joint tort-feasors" included only those who acted in concert to commit a wrong. But it has been broadened by the courts to include parties who have an undivided
liability for a single injury. It will be used in that sense in this note. Thus it matters little
whether the respective fault of the parties was concerted, concurrent, or successive, although
such factors undoubtedly have a bearing on their rights to contribution and indemnity. One
authority has argued that the use of "joint tort-feasors" in this manner is one of the primary
causes for the extension of the no-contribution rule by the courts to tort-feasors even though
they did not act in concert or intentionally. Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25
Calif. L. Rev. 413 (1937).
6 Prosser, Torts iix3 n. 29 (194).
7 E.g., Reath, Contribution between Persons Jointly Charged for Negligence, 12 Harv. L.
Rev. 176 (1898); Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity between Tortfeasors, 81 U. of Pa. L.
Rev. 130 (x932); Bohlen, Contribution and Indemnity between Tortfeasors, 2X Cornell L.Q.
552 (936); Gregory, Legislative Loss Distribution in Negligence Actions (x936).
8See cases cited note 64 infra. The American Law Institute codifies the no-contribution
rule in relation to negligent tort-feasor. Rest., Restitution § 102 (1937). But the Restaters
note that the rule is explainable only on historical grounds. Ibid., § r02, Comment a.
9 James, Contribution among Joint Tortfeasors: A Pragmatic Criticism, 54 Harv. L. Rev.
i156 (194i). James' thesis is that tort liability should be distributed over society as a whole
since society is best able to bear the loss, and that where such distribution is not possible those
who can best pay for the injury should bear the loss. Since the injured plaintiff will probably
sue the wealthier defendant, James asserts that the loss should remain on him and not be
shifted. Gregory answered this contention: "I agree that in torts shifting of statistically unavoidable loss to society as a whole is advantageous; workmen's compensation has certainly
proved most desirable.... While Mr. James' share of this debate has impressed me with the
need for cutting clear of our common-law heritage of tort law... until we do cut clear, almost
anything, even contribution among tortfeasors, is an improvement on the present state of
affairs." Gregory, Contribution among Joint Tortfeasors: A Defense, 54 Harv. L. Rev. 1170,
1171, 1189 (I941).
10James and Gregory brought the position of the insurance companies to the attention of
lawyers and law students in a series of enlightening articles in the Harvard Law Review.
James, Contribution among Joint Tortfeasors: A Pragmatic Criticism, 54 Harv. L. Rev. 1156

(194); Gregory, Contribution among Joint Tortfeasors: A Defense, 54 Harv. L. Rev. 1170
(r94i); James, Replication, 54 Harv. L. Rev. 1178 (941); Gregory, Rejoinder, 54 Harv. L.

Rev. XI84 (1941).
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ments." In practice, however, a rule permitting contribution in negligence
cases should not impede settlements reached by amicable agreement between
plaintiff and co-defendants. The deterrent effect on settlements of such a contribution rule would only be of importance in instances where the insurance
company of one co-tort-feasor settled with plaintiff quickly, cheaply, and in
return for a covenant not to sue. 2 Should the plaintiff exercise his right to sue
the other co-tort-feasor, the latter would have a right to contribution from the
covenantee to the extent that the covenantee's share of the plaintiff's recovery
was greater than the settlement.'3
Courts retaining a strict no-contribution rule have often been confronted with
situations in which flagrant injustice would result from an application of the
rule. Consequently, where one tort-feasor was guilty of only slight negligence
and another's action was the "substantial cause" of the damage, many courts
allowed full recovery, or indemnity, to the former because he was said to be
liable "secondarily" or guilty of only "passive" neglect.4 In so doing, these
courts have further confused the already vague line between negligence and
absolute liability by extending indemnity principles from the orthodox situation
in which one co-tort-feasor has been held liable without fault to situations in
which both co-tort-feasors were guilty of negligence although in different degrees. Serious question arises whether this extension of indemnity does not undermine the hitherto inviolable no-contribution rule in negligence cases, since
contribution should not be denied where indemnity is allowed.
A recent Illinois Appellate Court decisions appears to achieve precisely this

paradoxical result by granting indemnity to a less negligent co-tort-feasor who
could not have obtained contribution under what is said to be the Illinois rule.
"James, Replication, 54 Harv. L. Rev. 1178, 1182 (1941).
12 If the insurance company obtained a general release in return for the settlement, all tortfeasors (and their insurance companies) would, of course, be freed from further liability. Similarly, if the first insurance company paid its fair share of the total claim, there could be no
recovery in a suit for contribution. Where a tortfeasor has received only a covenant not to sue
as consideration for a settlement, he may not sue for contribution under the Uniform Contribution among Tortfeasors Act § 2(3). 9 U.L.A. x57-58 (igsi). For a fuller description of the
nature of contribution and indemnity under the Uniform Act see text and notes at notes
13 and 65-68 infra.
13 Under §§ 2(3), 4 and 5 of the Uniform Contribution among Tortfeasors Act, for example,
a "release" by an injured person 6f one joint tortfeasor cannot serve as a general release for the
other tortfeasors unless it is explicitly so stipulated in the release; and where there is no such
stipulation, the tortfeasor who was released is liable to contribute the difference between his
payment for release and his pro rata share of the total liability unless his release specifically
provided for a reduction of the total liability by the full amont of his pro rata share. 9 U.L.A.
157, 161-63 (195i).
'4

E.g., Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. East Texas Public Service Co., 48 F. 2d

5 th, z93i); Colorado & Southern Ry.
214 Pac. 30, 31 (1923); Washington

23, 25

(C.A.

Co. v. Western Light & Power Co., 73 Colo.. 107, 110,

Gas Light Co. v. District of Columbia, 16i U.S. 316
(I896).
s Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R. Co. v. Arthur Dixon Transfer Co., 343 Ill. App. 148, 98 N.E. 2d
783 (ist Dist., igi).
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An analysis of Illinois contribution and indemnity law is here undertaken to
demonstrate the need for judicial clarification of contribution and indemnity
principles in negligence cases and for general legislative reform of contribution
law.
I. CONTRIBUTION IN ILLINOIS

The few litigated cases involving contribution between tort-feasors warrant
a belief that the no-contribution rule as to intentional tort-feasors is in full
force in Illinois, although one decision militates against even this view. At the
other extreme, contribution has generally been allowed between tort-feasors
liable without fault. However, in the negligence category, under which most
contribution cases would be expected to arise, no direct Illinois precedents exist.
Hence the feeling of many Illinois attorneys that there is no contribution among
negligent tort-feasors seems to be based more on supposition and the law of
other jurisdictions than on direct Illinois authority.
In an early decision, Goldsborough v. Darst, 6 contribution was allowed between two persons who had fraudulently attempted to acquire property through
a foreclosure sale. After making restitution of $4,8oo, one of the wrongdoers
filed a bill in equity and recovered $2,427.15. In allowing the suit, the Appellate
Court stated that "[iun certain cases of torts and trespasses, it is certain that
courts will not interfere to equalize burthens, but there are so many exceptions
to the rule that it has ceased to be a general one.' 7 The case is unique in that,
far from denying the contribution rule, it seems even to expand it so as to include
certain types of intentional tort-feasors. Language in later cases and at least one
direct holding x indicate, however, that the rule of Merryweather v. Nixon,
denying contribution between intentional tort-feasors, is considered controlling
in Illinois.19
Where two persons have engaged in an enterprise resulting in tort liability
due to the fault of neither, contribution exists between such parties. Consequently if a number of creditors innocently convert the chattels of a third person
by attachment, the creditor who is forced to pay the entire claim is entitled to
169 Ill.
App. 205 (2d Dist., z88i).
'7 Ibid., at 2rI. See Stanton v. McMullen, 7 Ill.
App. 326, 329 (2d Dist., I880), for language to the same effect.
ISWanack v. Michels, 215 Il. 87 (19o5). An owner of a building leased it for a dramshop
and consequently, after being held liable in damages to a third person, he was not permitted to
recover contribution from the tavern keeper. The court stated: "It is a general and long-established rule that neither contribution nor indemnity will be given to one of several tort feasors
against the others ....And although this rule is only applied to cases of intentional and
conscious wrongdoing... yet it cannot be said that, in the case at bar, the wrongdoing of the
owner of the premises, who leases them with permission to the occupant to sell intoxicating
liquor thereon, and with knowledge that such liquor is sold thereon, is not intentional. The
owner, under the circumstances mentioned in the statute, must be regarded as committing
the tortious act with guilty intent." Ibid., at 94"-95.
19The Darst case has been cited in only two cases, neither one an Illinois case.
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contribution from the others in equal shares.20 In so holding the Illinois Supreme
Court stated in Farwellv. Becker: "There are cases which hold that no right of
contribution exists between wrongdoers. Merryweather v. Nixon ... may be
regarded as a leading case on the subject ....
But the rule is to be understood
according to its true sense and meaning, which is, where the tort is a known,
meditated wrong, and not where the party is acting under the supposition of the
entire innocence and propriety of the act, and the tort is merely one of construc''
tion or inference of law. 2I
Between the extremes of intentional torts and absolute liability, there is
as yet no case which either grants or denies contribution where both tortfeasors were merely negligent. Dicta, however, support the right of contribution
between directors of a corporation who create an indebtedness above the
maximum allowed by statute,- or who fail to perform their duty of exercising reasonable care in conduct of the corporate enterprise but are not charged
with an intentional wrong. 23 On the other hand, the obscure case of Rend v.
Chicago W. D. Ry. Co.,24 at first glance, seems to have denied contribution between negligent tort-feasors.A street-car owned by P collided with a horsedrawn wagon driven by D, thereby injuring one of the street-car passengers who
recovered a judgment against P. P sought $7,ooo damages alleged to have resulted from D's negligence, including $4,ooo special damages, the amount paid
to the injured passenger. In overruling a demurrer to the complaint, the appeals
court held that it stated a cause of action on the theory that an allegation of
special damages was not necessary in an action for wilful trespass such as the
complaint averred.25 After being instructed that if the injury resulted from the
negligence of D, P should recover, but if the injury resulted from the negligence
of P, it should not, the jury returned a $2,ooo verdict for P. Reversing the verdict
and judgment, the Appellate Court insisted that the jury should also have been
instructed that "if it [the injury] resulted from the joint operation of the negligence of both drivers," the verdict should nevertheless be for D.21 In other words,
if the jury had found that P was guilty of contributory negligence, P could not
recover in a tort action against D. Neither could P then recover the special damages, or indemnity, for "[i]n that case both parties would have been responsible
for the injury, and one party, after having been compelled to respond in
20 Farwell v. Becker, 129 I1. 261 (i889), rev'g 25 Ill. App. 432 (ist Dist., 1887); Selz,
Schwab & Co. v. Guthman, 62 fI1. App. 624 (ist Dist., x896). The Selz case illustrates the
distinction between indemnity and contribution. It was held that the innocent sheriff was
entitled to indemnity from the creditors, and a creditor was entitled to contribution after he
had paid the indemnity.

20

29 Ill. 261, 269 (i889).

Illinois State Bank v. Queen City Quarry Co., 203 Ill. App. 176, 177 (4th Dist., 1916).
23Wallach v. Billings, 195 Ill. App. 6oS, 617 (ist Dist., 1915).

24 6 Ill. App. 243 (ist Dist., i88o); 8 Ill. App. 517 (ist Dist., 1881).
2s Chicago W. D. Ry. Co. v. Rend, 6 Ill. App. 243 (ist Dist., i88o).
26Rend. v. Chicago West Division Ry. Co., 8 Ill. App. 517, 525 (ist Dist., 1881).
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damages to the person injured, could not call upon the other party to contribute
' 27
all or any portion of the damages so paid.'
Although it might be argued that the jury had in effect granted contribution
to P when it returned the $2,00o verdict, P had sued for full recovery of the
amount paid the injured person, $4,ooo. Hence, on its facts the case has nothing
to do with contribution, and the decision may simply stand for the proposition
that an action for indemnity will not lie where the negligence of both parties
concurs to cause the injury. Equally, it may be distinguished as a simple case of
contributory negligence if it is assumed that the jury's verdict was for damages
to P's street car. But, as the above quotation indicates, the Rend court asserted
that the same rule applied to a recovery for "any portion of the damages so
paid." This appears to refer to the right of contribution; but it is dictum and
8
without direct support in any Illinois decision.2
No case involving contribution for mere negligence between joint tort-feasors
has been discovered in the appellate court records of Illinois for the past halfcentury. There has been consistent reiteration of the no-contribution rule, particularly in cases holding that it is unnecessary to join co-tort-feasors in a negligence action.29 But this would be true whether the right of contribution existed
or not.30 These dicta, coupled with the prevalent belief among members of the
Illinois Bar that the right of contribution does not exist among joint tortfeasors in Illinois,3' probably accounts for the paucity of cases on the subject.
II. INDEMNITY IN ILLINOIS

As already noted, when a person is adjudged liable for injury to another without fault on his part, he is entitled to indemnity from any person whose negligence or intentional wrongdoing caused the injury. A number of situations fall
into this pattern. Thus where a principal is held responsible for the acts or omissions of his agent he may be without personal fault, and, if so, is entitled to
7Ibid., at 525 (emphasis added).
"8The Rend opinions have been cited a total of three times, once in an 1898 Illinois Appellate decision, but never on their indemnity-contribution aspects.
9See Johnson v. Chicago & Pacific Elevator Co., 1o5 Ill. 462 (1882); Consolidated Ice
Machine Co. v. Keifer, 134 Ill. 481 (i888), aff'g 26 Ill. App. 466 (4th Dist., 1889); Vieths v.
Skinner, 47 Ill. App. 325, 328 (4 th Dist., z893); Consolidated Fireworks Co. v. Koehl, 92 IIl.
App. 8, il (2d Dist., xgoo); Aldridge v. Morris, 337 Ill. App. 369, 86 N.E. 2d 143 (2d Dist.,
1949). In the Aldridge case, the court displayed a curious intermingling of the joinder rule
with the no-contribution rule by asserting: "[lilt is elementary that contribution by joint tortfeasors will not be enforced and that each is liable for the full damages on the ground that the
law will not undertake to adjust the burdens of misconduct." Aidridge v. Morris, supra, at
375-76 and 146.
30 See Grewenig v. American Baking Co., 293 Ill. App. 604, 61o, 13 N.E. 2d 183, i85
(1938); Clark, Code Pleading § 59 at 374-75 (2d ed., i947); Prosser, Torts § lo9 at 11o 3

(1941).

31 The statement of this "belief" is based on an informal inquiry among a number of practicing attorneys in the Chicago area. All those contacted classified Illinois with the states not
allowing contribution in negligence cases.
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indemnity from the agent.32 This is true even though the master and servant are
sued jointly as joint tort-feasors.33 Conversely, if an agent who relied upon his
principal's direction as an assurance of a right to exercise dominion over certain
property is adjudged a converter, he is entitled to indemnity from his principal.34
In these cases, if the agent did not know that his actions were wrongful, his liability is purely technical and involves no notion of fault.s
Liability without fault also arises in situations where one is held responsible
because of a nondelegable duty he owes to a special class of people. By statute
or common law, a person may become liable because of the failure of an independent contractor to exercise the care and competence necessary for performance of what may be termed "dangerous" work. In these cases, he is entitled
to indemnity from
the independent contractor through whose fault he has
6
liable.3
become
The foregoing cases have involved situations where the indemnitee was without fault, yet held liable to a third person injured through the fault of the indemnitor. In other situations where the one seeking indemnity could not claim
complete lack of fault, he was nevertheless permitted to recover. For example,
it has been held in a long series of cases that while a municipality is liable
"primarily" for injuries suffered as a result of a nuisance created by the occupier
of premises adjoining a public highway, it has a right to be indemnified "from
the person whose duty it was to keep the premises in repair."37 It has been said
3'Sherman House Hotel Co. v. Butler Street Foundry & Iron Co., i68 Ill. App. 549 (ist

Dist.,

i912).

33 Skala v. Lehon, 343 Ill. 6o2, 175 N.E. 832 (1931), aff'g 258 Ill. App. 252 (ist Dist.,
193o); Barton v. Adanick, 251 Ill. App. 481 (ist Dist., 1929). Contra: Herman Berghoff
Brewing Co. v. Przbylski, 82 Ill. App. 361 (ist Dist., 1899).
34 It has been held that if P has a writ which authorizes him to take property of another
and directs an officer serving it to take specified goods of a third person, the officer is entitled
to indemnity if by seizing the goods he becomes a converter. Grimes v. Taylor, 93 II. App. 494
(2d Dist., i9oi); Sez, Schwab & Co. v. Guthman, 62 Ill. App. 624 (ist Dist., i895). See Farwell v. Becker, 129 Ill. 261, 21 N.E. 792 (i888), rev'g 25 Iln. App. 432 (ist Dist., 1887); Nelson
v. Cook, 17 Ill. 443 (z856). If in fact the agent knows of the wrong, no indemnity will lie.
See Nelson v. Cook, supra. Also, the officer is not entitled to indemnity when specified goods
are not pointed out as in such cases he acts at his discretion and no principal-agency relationship arises. Ibid.
35 In conversion, "neither good nor bad faith, neither care nor negligence, neither knowledge
nor ignorance, are of the gist of the action." All that is necessary is the exercise of control and
dominion over the goods of another. Prosser, Torts § 15 at ioi n. 68 (1941).
1 36 Sherman House Hotel Co. v. Butler Street Foundry & Iron Co., 168 Ill. App. 549 (ist
Dist., 1912). In this case one performing the dangerous work was held to be an employee, but
the court stated that the employer would be liable "whether the iron company was an independent contractor or merely an employee ..... Ibid., at 551 See Scammon v. City of Chicago, 25 Ill. 424 (i86i); Pfau v. Williamson, 63 111. x6 (1872).
37 Gridley v. City of Bloomington, 68 Ill. 47, 53 (1873). Further cases to the same effect
are: McDaneld v. Logi, 143 Ill. 487 (1892); McDonald v. Village of Lockport, 28 Ill. App.
157 (2d Dist., i888); Knox, Adm'r. v. City of Sterling, 73 Ill. 214 (1874); Fahey v. Town of
Harvard, 62 Ill. 28 (1871); Severin v. Eddy, 52 Ill. i89 (1869); Scammon v. City of Chicago,
25 Ill. 424 (i86i).
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that the municipality is held liable simply because many times it is the only
party financially capable of satisfying the injured person and that consequently it has a right of action over if the tort-feasor is capable of reimbursing
the city.35 Because these strong public policy reasons exist, it might be wiser to
treat the municipal liability cases as not within the area of the usual indemnity
cases with which this note is concerned. The municipal liability decisions represent, however, an extension of indemnity law to situations where the indemnitee,
who is under a duty to inspect, is guilty of concurrent negligence as against the
injured third person, although probably to a lesser degree than the perpetrator
of the nuisance.
Municipal liability decisions have been used to extend the principle of indemnity from the absolute liability situation to other cases where the indemnitee
is also guilty of negiligence to the third person. In Chicago Rys. Co. v. R. F.
Conway Co.,39 a street car company, which by agreement with the city was required to make repairs on its tracks, employed a contractor, D, to do this work
giving him complete control. On a dark night, a policeman speeding by on his
motorcycle ran into an excavation near the tracks was injured and recovered
judgment against the street car company. The court allowed an indemnity action against D by the company on the theory that while the company was liable
for not performing a nondelegable duty (to guard its excavations properly) imposed by city ordinance, it had a right over against one who had assumed to
perform that duty for it. The gist of the decision is the right of the street car
company to rely on the contractor to perform faithfully his contractual duty.4o
Failure to do so raised an implied promise to make whole the person who relied,
the indemnitee.
Basing its decision on a different line of reasoning, however, the court stated
that the "general rule" of no-contribution or indemnity between joint tortfeasors applied only in cases of intentional wrongdoing. Then, borrowing language used by courts in other jurisdictions, the court stated that the company
and D "were not in pari delicto in the personal injury suit and [D] being guilty
of the greater wrong, the plaintiff having paid the judgment is entitled to indemnity."4' These words imply that in all other cases, one "guilty of the
greater wrong" would be liable to pay the full amount to his fellow tort-feasor
where the parties were not guilty of equal wrong. This case is, of course, a bloodbrother of absolute liability decisions involving an independent contractor who
is negligent in performing dangerous work. In both cases the employer is re38 See Bohlen, Contribution and Indemnity between Tortfeasors, 22 Comell L.Q. 469, 479
(i937); 4 Dillon, Municipal Corporations 3032 (5th ed., ii).
Another rationalization advanced to explain these cases is that the municipality has a right over because the indemnitor
has also committed a tort against the city by creating a nuisance on public property. Consult
Hodges, Contribution and Indemnity among Tortfeasors, 26 Tex. L. Rev. io (i947).
39 219 11. App. 220 (ist Dist., 1920).

40 See note si infra.
4' Chicago Rys. Co. v. R. F. Conway Co., 219

fI.

App.

220,

224 (ist Dist.,

1920).
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sponsible because the law affixes a nondelegable duty upon him. Although the
Conway case is distinguishable because of the presence of a mild degree of concurring negligence on the part of the employer who failed to perform his duty
toward third persons, as against the contractor, the employer had a right of recovery based on the contractor's implied promise to perform the employer's duty
for him. Inter se employer and contractor, the former was, in a sense, without
fault.
Indemnity was extended to a new fact situation in PennsylvaniaR. Co. v.
Roberts & Schaefer Co. D had contracted to construct a dry sand hopper for
P railroad company for use in sanding the latter's locomotives. D had negligently secured a counterweight while installing a valve on the machine. One of
P's employees was hit on his head when the counterweight fell from its suspension twenty-four feet above the ground. After settling with the severely injured employee, P sued D in case for the amount so paid. In remanding the case
and holding that the complaint stated a cause of action, the Appellate Court
asserted that "where a person had been compelled to pay damages on account
of the negligence of a third party, the person so paying, when he is without fault
or negligence on his part and the injury is solely the result of the negligence of
the third party, may recover such damages from the third party."43 After an

adverse verdict by the jury, P appealed for a second time; and the Appellate
Court on this occasion disapproved an instruction by the trial court to the
effect that if P and D were both negligent in causing the injury, P could not
recover. The Appellate tribunal felt that "not being in pari delicto, the rule of
law which prevents contribution or indemnity between joint tortfeasors does
not apply,"44 citing the Conway case as support. The court reasoned that P did
not create "the unsafe or dangerous condition from which the injury resulted," S
and was liable to the employee merely because "it failed to furnish him [the employee] a reasonably safe place in which to do his work."46 Here again is a situa-

tion in which the indemnitee had a right to rely upon the indemnitor's implied
promise to perform the indemnitee's duty. The Schaefer case might have been
successfully brought on the theory that the vendor (contractor) impliedly warranted the fitness of the machine.4 7 But the point was not considered by the
court and apparently was not urged before it.
The last time the Illinois Supreme Court reviewed Illinois indemnity law
the question was not perceptibly clarified, probably because the court had no
42244 Ill.
App. 646 (ist Dist., 1927), 250 Ill.
App. 330 (rst Dist., 1928).
43 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Roberts & Schaefer Co., unreported opinion: Abstract No.
31,469, abstract reported at 244 Ill.
App. 646 (ist Dist., 1927).
44 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Roberts & Schaefer Co., 250 Ill.
App. 330, 335 (xst Dist., 1928).
45 Ibid., at 337.
46 Ibid.
47 See i Williston, Sales §§ 232, 235 (rev. ed., 1948); Bohlen, Contribution and Indemnity
between Tortfeasors, 22 Cornell L.Q. 469, 477 (1937).
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occasion to face the situation squarely. Simply stated, the issue was whether
public policy prevented a contractor from undertaking to indemnify a bililding
owner against loss due to the latter's negligence although a statute made it the
owner's personal duty to see that the work was performed carefully.48 Relying
on cases which allowed indemnity under similar circumstances in the ahsence
of express contractual provisions, the court held such a contract valid.49 In so
holding the court declared that in an action between negligent tort-feasors,
"the law would inquire into the delinquency of the parties, and place the ultimate liability upon him whose fault had been the primary cause of the injury."so
While the language of some of the decisions would warrant a much broader
rule, the Illinois indemnity cases presented thus far have involved situations
either where one tort-feasor acted without fault, or where, though guilty of some
small concurring negligence, the indemnitee had a right to rely (because of his
special relationship with the indemnitor) on the indemnitor's performing the
indemnitee's duty.5s
In light of this discussion, the significance of a recent ruling of the Illinois
2
Appellate Court in Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R. Co. v. Arthur Dixon Transfer Co.s
becomes apparent. One Wehunt, a switchman employed b r P railroad, was
4SIndemnity actions based upon express contractual provisions are, of course, not within
the scope of this note. Neither are indemnity rights, or actions of like nature, which are given
expressly by statute, i.e., contribution between corporation directors, Ill. Rev. Stat. (1949)
c. 32, § 157 .42(h), and subrogation under the workmen's compensation statute, fI1. Rev. Stat.
(1949) c. 48, § 166.
49 John Griffiths & Son Co. v. Nat'l Fireproofing Co., 310 Ill.
331, r41 N.E. 739 (1973).
s*John Griffiths & Son Co. v. Nat'l Fireproofing Co., 310 Ill.
331, 337, 141 N.E. 739, 741
(1923). The court also talks about "the justice of requiring the person whose actual negligence

was the proximate cause of the injury" to pay indemnity to one who was merely guilty of
"passive negligence." Ibid., at 337 and 74r. For similar language in other jurisdiction' b consult
Meriam and Thornton, Indemnity between Tort-feasors: An Evolving Doctrine of the New
York Court of Appeals, 25 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 845 (i95o).
s,According to Bohlen: "Justifiable reliance is ...the soundest ground upon which the
right to indemnity can be placed." Bohlen, Contribution and Indemnity between Tortfeasors,
22 Cornell L.Q. 469, 478 ('r937). The Illinois court in Trego v. Rubovits, 178 Ill. App. 127,134
(1st Dist., 1913), restated the same rule in particularized form: "In all that class of cases %where

one party owes a legal duty to the public and to third persons to keep a place or instrumentality
reasonably safe, whenever another, by contract, agrees to perform that duty for him upon cufficient consideration, such contract by implication of law becomes one of indemnity and reiders
the party assuming such duty by contract liable for all damages that may legally be recotered
by third persons against such party upon whom the law Iad in the first instar-ce cast such
duty... ." On the basis of Texas decisions, another writer has given a general rule to cover
the indemnity cases: "Where there are two tortfeasors, either or both of whom are liable ttan
injured third person, but one of whom has breached a duty which he owed both to his :otortfeasor and to the injured third person, then the tortfeasor who, to his co-tortfeasor, is
blameless, should be allowed indemnity." Hodges, Contribution and Indemnity among Totfeasors, 26 Tex. L.Rev. i5o, 162 (1947). The formulations of Bohlen and Hodges are similar.
The indemnitor must owe a "special duty" arising by virtue of contract or tort and be free
of fault as to his co-tortfeasor before the indemnitee can have total recovery from the indemnitor.
s-343 Ill. App. 4q9,93 N.E. 2d 783 (ist Dist., i95i).
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riding on a box car being pushed along P's tracks by a locomotive. D trucking
company had parked one of its vehicles next to the tracks. When the box car
reached a point adjacent to the parked trailer, Wehunt, who was hanging on to
a ladder attached to the box car, was crushed between the parked trailer and
the box car. Two years later P settled3 with Wehunt paying him $17,840 plus
hospital and surgical expenses of $6,658.80. Previous to this, P had notified D
that P would look to D for full reimbursement of all expenses incurred because
of D's alleged negligence in parking its trailer too close to the tracks. When D
refused to admit responsibility,4 P sued on implied indemnity for $ 2o,ooo.5S

The Appellate Court reversed a ruling of the trial court which had sustained
D's notion to strike and dismiss the complaint56
Justice Schwartz, in deciding for the plaintiff, lamented the fact that the
vocabulary of negligence law is inadequate for our day. He dismissed the statements of some courts that the indemnitee must be without fault in order to recover with the assertion that "what is meant is that plaintiff by act of defendant was made liable ... even though he, plaintiff, was not guilty of any active
negligence,"S 7 but only of "passive" negligence. In order to avoid difficulty in
applying this test to the facts, the Justice noted that "mere motion does not define the distinction between active and passive negligence."5s
S3Because of the settlement, the indemnitee must, of course, prove he did not pay the
injured third person voluntarily. Fahey v. Town of Harvard, 22 Ill. 28 (1871). At the trial
the reasonableness of the amount of settlement is a matter of proof and plaintiff must establish
by evidence the amount of damages it has sustained. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Roberts & Schaefer Co., unreported opinion: Abstract No. 31,469, abstract reported at 244 Ill. App. 646 (ist
Dist., X927). P evidently felt that it could prove liability because it was responsible under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act for its failure to provide safe working conditions for its
employees despite the seeming contributory negligence of the plaintiff employee, since, under
the FELA, contributory negligence is not a complete defense. 35 Stat. 65 (igo8), as amended,

s

(z943).
45 U.S.C.A. §
S4 If the injured employee had sued D, contributory negligence on his part would probably
have defeated his cause of action (see text and footnote atnote 62 infra) even though he might
still have an action against P. Consult note 53 supra. This fact was urged by counsel for D as
a reason for the denial of indemnity, since the result might be that P could recover against
th' trucking company, although D might have had a complete .defense if it had been sued
directly by the injured employee. Brief and Argument for Appellee at 32, Gulf, Mobile &
Olio R. Co. v. Arthur Dixon Transfer Co. 343 Ill. App. 148, 98 N.E. 2d 783 (ist Dist., 195i).
On facts almost identical with the Arthur Dixon case, a lower federal court has ruled that
no .ndemnity action was available. Wallace v. New Orleans Public Belt R. Co. 78 F. Supp.
72A (E.D. La., 1948), rev'd on other (jurisdictional) grounds, 173 F. 2d 145 (C.A. Sth, 1949).
There the court expressly stated: "To permit [P] to have its cross-claim would afford it the
onportunity of transferring to [D] what may be termed the residuum of negligence, for which
[M alone should be held liable, if the jury should find that both [P] and [the injured employee]
,%ere negligent." Ibid., at 726.
ss Apparently P's payments had been in return for a complete release from Wehunt, rather
than a covenant not to sue, so that D could have been held liable, if at all, only through a suit
by P.
56 Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R. Co. v. Arthur Dixon Transfer Co., 343 Ill. App. 148, 98 N.E. 2d
783 (istDist., i75i).
57 Ibid., at 156, 787-

s8 Ibid., at 158 , 788.
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The Arthur Dixon case carries the pan delicto rationalization of the prior Illinois indemnity cases to its logical conclusion. While there was no jury trial in
the case to determine whether both parties were negligent and which was "more
negligent," it is obvious from the complaint that the railroad company, the indemnitee, was negligent in some degree in failing to discover the parked truck
and then moving its locomotive past it with an employee riding on the outside
ladder. The doctrine of the Conway and Schaefer decisions was not applicable
because here there was no relationship between indemnitor and indemnitee
which would give the indemnitee a right to rely on the indemnitor's performing
the indemnitee's duty. Justice Schwartz, however, apparently felt that the jury
could find the railroad company less negligent than the trucking company
and by so doing raise sufficient grounds for implied indemnity s 9
The result of the Arthur Dixon case and the general language in other Illinois
indemnity cases warrants the belief that as long as the parties are not in pari
delicto the courts will award indemnity to the party guilty of the lesser wrong.
If a general no-contribution rule with reference to negligence cases actually
exists in Illinois, then a less negligent tort-feasor can recover indemnity (all) from
his co-tort-feasors, but he cannot recover contribution (less). Manifestly, whatever inroads the Arthur Dixon case creates in indemnity law, it must also produce in contribution law.6" Another result of the case may be to obliterate any
distinction between orthodox indemnity cases, where the indemnitee has acted
without fault as against the indemnitor, and to merge that category with the
negligence decisions so that indemnity can be had in all situations except where
the co-tort-feasors have acted intentionally or were guilty of "equal" negligence.
111. CONCLUSION

Certain theoretical difficulties have been advanced as reasons why the nocontribution rule should remain in effect as to negligent tort-feasors. Judicial
dislike of the comparative negligence doctrine has been offered as a justification
for disallowance of contribution between negligent joint tort-feasors. 6' Since the
desire to avoid aiding a wrongdoer is so strong in Illinois that lack of contributory negligence must be alleged as part of plaintiff's prima facie case,62 a strict
s9 The case was later dismissed by stipulation of the parties presumably because a settlement had been reached.
6o Apparently this was quite clear to the court in the Arthur Dixon decision for it repeatedly
used the terms indemnity and contribution interchangeably as if there was no difference between them. For example, the court states: "The trial court gave no reasons for striking the
complaint but undoubtedly it was on the supposition that the railroad was a tort-feasor
seeking contribution from another and therefore could not recover on its theory of implied
indemnity. There are many exceptions to the general principle of noncontribution between
tort-feasors recognized by the courts of this and other states and by the federal courts." Gulf,
Mobile & Ohio R. Co. v. Arthur Dixon Transfer Co., 343 Ill. App. 148, 152, 98 N.E. 2d 783, 785
(ist Dist., x95I).
6, Contribution or Indemnity between Joint Tort-Feasors, 5 U. of Cin. L. Rev. 339, 342
(1931).

6AIllinois Central R. Co. v. Oswald, 338 Ill. 270, 170 N.E. 247 (1930).
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no-contribution rule in negligence cases follows almost as a necessary corollary
of the same policy. In effect, however, the Illinois court in the Arthur Dixon
case applied a modified comparative negligence test by first deciding which
party was the "more negligent" and shifting the entire loss to him.6 3 Such a
total shift is warranted only where one party is largely without fault, as was
true in the indemnity cases prior to the Arthur Dixon case. In other situations
it may be fair, as between co-tort-feasors, for the one guilty of greater wrong
to bear the total loss, yet it would be still fairer to apportion the loss proportionally and carry to its logical conclusion the comparative negligence test of
the Arthur Dixon decision.
An enlightened Illinois court could dispel the confusion produced by intermingling the terms indemnity and contribution and award indemnity only where
one party is without fault and contribution in all other cases.14 The swiftest and
most sensible solution is, of course, for the legislature to adopt a few statutory
innovations, such as those contained in the Uniform Contribution among
Tortfeasors Act,6S as part of a general scheme of introducing comparative
6.3This position is strongly similar to the view formerly held by the Illinois courts in the
related field of contributory negligence. There also the negligence of the tort-feasor and the
plaintiff was once compared and "the end result was that the plaintiff either recovered in full
or got nothing at all. The element providing for the apportionment of the damages, according
to the relative amounts of negligence displayed, was missing." Turk, Comparative Negligence
on the March, 28 Chi.-Kent Rev. 304, 308 (195o); Green, Illinois Negligence Law, 39 Ill. L.
Rev. 36 (i944).
64 Some jurisdictions have recently accepted this "enlightened" view. E.g., George's Radio,
Inc. v. Capital Transit Co., 126 F. 2d 219 (App. D.C., 1942), noted in 3 Wash. & Lee L. Rev.
307 (1942); Preferred Accident Ins. Co. v. Musante, Berman & Steinberg Co., 133 Conn. 536,
52 A. 2d 862 (i947), noted in 22 Conn. Bar J. 171 (1948); Davis v. Broad Street Garage, 19i
Tenn. 320, 232 S.W. 2d 355 (r950), noted in 3x B.U.L. Rev. 116 (i95x).
Under a common-law contribution scheme in Illinois, the contributee would have to begin a
new law suit, after payment of the judgment recovered by the injured third person, in order
to recover contribution. There is no third party practice in Illinois, and one tort-feasor cannot implead his co-tort-feasor even if the right to contribution existed. See Gregory, Third
Party Practice under the New Illinois Practice Act and Chicago Municipal Court Rules, z
Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 536 (1934).
6s Uniform Contribution among Tortfeasors Act, 9 U.L.A. i59 (19si), adopted, as of i95i,
in Arkansas, Hawaii, Maryland, New Mexico, Rhode Island and South Dakota. Consult Stevens, A Proposal for Contribution among Joint Tortfeasors in Ohio, i Western Reserve L.
Rev. So (ig5i).
Many states have enacted other types of contribution statutes. A particular difficulty with
some of the statutes is that they limit the right to contribution between tort-feasors to instances where the injured plaintiff has recovered a joint judgment against the co-defendants.
Md. Code Ann. (Flack, 1939) Art. 50, § 13; Mo. Rev. Stat. (i939) § 3658; Laws of N.Y.
(Thompson, 1939) Civ. Prac. Act § 2ii-a. But some statutes state that this fact is immaterial
and allow contribution even if the plaintiff recovered a judgment against only one of the defendants. Gen. Stat. of N.C. (z943) § 1-240; Va. Code Ann. (1930) § 5779. Since the right
of contribution is for the benefits of defendants, this view seems more sensible since they make
the plaintiff's failure or refusal to procure a joint judgment unimportant.
Wisconsin's procedure obviates this difficulty and provides a method for introducing a complete contribution scheme. In that state the claimant may seek common-law contribution in
the injured plaintiff's own action by a cross-claim against his co-defendant. After trial, assuming a verdict for the plaintiff, a "contingent judgment" is rendered fixing the right of the
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negligence into Illinois law. Among co-tort-feasors guilty of intentional wrongs
or of equal negligence such a statute would permit equal apportionment of the
common liability." Indemnity rules would remain in effect where the indemnitee was without fault as to the indemnitor. 7 Within the framework of the
Arthur Dixon case, if the evidence had indicated that there was a disproportion
of fault among the tort-feasors, the court would have instructed the jury that
if it found the defendants to be negligent, they should also fix their relative degrees of fault; and contribution would have been granted accordingly.68
claimant to contribution when he himself has paid more than half of the judgment which
plaintiff recovered. After the claimant has made such payment, he receives final and executable
judgment for all that he has paid the plaintiff in excess of his own share of the obligation.
Wait v. Pierce, i91 Wis. 202, 225, 21o N.W. 822 (1926).
For a complete discussion of the varied contribution statutes consult: Modem Trend of the
Law of Contribution among Joint Tortfeasors, 6 Mont. L. Rev. 34 (1945); Gregory, Legislative
Loss Distribution in Negligence Actions (i936); Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity between
Tortfeasors, 8i U. of Pa. L Rev. 130 (1932).
66 Consult Uniform Contribution among Tortfeasors Act § 1, 9 U.L.A. 156 (ig5i).
6
7Ibid., at 163.
68
Ibid., at i61.

